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Comments
As Times Goes By: Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. And Its Effect On
California Defamation Law
Were it not for the fact that truth is a complete defense to libel, Dean
Prosser's introduction to his discussion of defamation might well be tor-
tious in itself:
It must be confessed at the beginning that there is a great deal
of the law of defamation which makes no sense. It contains
anomalies and absurdities for which no legal writer has had a kind
word, and it is a curious compound of a strict liability imposed
upon innocent defendants, as rigid and extreme as anything found
in the law, with a blind and almost perverse refusal to compensate
the plaintiff for real and very serious harm.'
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,2 the United States Supreme Court
echoed the sentiments of Dean Prosser by characterizing the law of defa-
mation as an "oddity."'3 Gertz was a return to the ten-year struggle to
"define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and
the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment."'
While the Court withdrew from the broad privilege envisioned in the
earlier case of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,5 it nevertheless placed
new limitations upon the ability of the states to impose liability without
fault and to award presumed and punitive damages. This comment re-
views the development of the constitutional privilege and the status of
1. W. PRossER, HAINDBOO: OF THE LAW OF TORTS §111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
2. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
3. Id. at 349.
4. Id. at 325.
5. 403 U.S. 29, 52,(1971).
6. A general discussion of the constitutional privilege can be found in PRossER,
supra note 1, § 118. This comment deals with the effect of Gertz upon the law of defa-
mation in California. For a discussion of its effect on the constitutional privilege see,
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the California law of civil defamation prior to the Gertz decision, and
then analyzes how that law is affected by this recent case, examining in
turn the impact of Gertz upon the cause of action and upon the defenses.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE TO DEFAME
A. The New York Times Privilege: 1964-1974
Prior to 1964, several United States Supreme Court cases suggested
that defamatory remarks were not protected by the first amendment,"
but the Court had not definitively applied the suggestion to civil libel or
slander." Then in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan9 the Court held that
the first and fourteenth amendments bar a public official from recover-
ing damages for a defamatory statement about his official conduct un-
less he can prove that the statement was published with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false. Al-
though the Court drew upon analogies to seditious libel10 and the public
official's own privilege of defamation," it based its holding on the ra-
tionale that nonreckless falsehood must be tolerated if freedom of ex-
pression is to have a necessary "breathing space." 2
The New York Times majority proved insufficiently cohesive to sur-
vive the extension of the constitutional privilege to statements about sub-
jects other than public officials. While Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts0
expanded the privilege to include remarks about public figures, and Ro-
senbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.14 applied the holding to a discussion of a
public event, neither case rested upon a majority opinion. In a plurality
opinion in Butts, Justice Harlan argued that the state interest in protect-
ing reputation varies with the public or private status of the plaintiff
Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel
Law and the First Amendment, 26 HAsT. LJ. 777 (1975).
7. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961); Times Film Co.
v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-
87 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
8. In Schenectady Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642 (1942), afj'g
122 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941), an equally divided Court affirmed a court of appeals deci-
sion which held that the first amendment did not protect defamation.
9. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Although the disposition of the New York
Times case was unanimous, Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg were of the opinion
that the privilege should be absolute rather than conditional. Id. at 293 (Black & Doug-
las, IJ., concurring), 298 (Goldberg & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
10. Id. at 273-78.
11. Id. at 282-83, citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), for the holding that
defamatory statements made by a public official in the course of his official duties are
absolutely privileged.
12. 376 U.S. at 271-72.
13. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
14. 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971).
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because that status determines his ability to effectively respond to de-
famatory comments and the degree to which he has assumed the risk of
such comments."5 Justice Brennan, writing another plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom, contended that the degree of first amendment protection is
dependent upon the public's interest in the event: if the event is of public
concern, then constitutional protection should attach without inquiry
into the plaintiff's status.' 6 A third approach, espoused by Justice Black
in both Butts and Rosenbloom, would have held that defamation is abso-
lutely protected by the first amendment.17 Against this disconcerting
background, the Court heard the Gertz case.
B. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
Elmer Gertz, an attorney, represented a family in a civil suit against
the Chicago policeman who had previously been convicted for the mur-
der of their son. American Opinion, a publication of the John Birch
Society, published an article in which the criminal trial was viewed as
part of a nationwide conspiracy to discredit local police forces, and
Gertz was accused of being a Communist and a criminal and of framing
the policeman. In fact the attorney had had only nominal contacts with
the criminal trial, and there was no basis for the statements that he was
either a Communist or a criminal.' 8
In a diversity suit for libel, the trial court, foreshadowing
Rosenbloom, held that the determinant of the constitutional privilege
was the public nature of the event which gave rise to the defamation.' 9
Since the policeman's trial was an event of public interest, and since the
plaintiff had failed to prove knowing or reckless falsity, judgment was
entered for the defendant, notwithstanding a $50,000 jury verdict for
the plaintiff." The Seventh Circuit, rendering its decision after Rosen-
bloom, approved the adoption of the public event test and affirmed the
judgment.2 '
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed in a long-awaited majority
opinion written by Justice Powell.22 The majority, concluding that the
15. 388 U.S. at 154-55 (Harlan, Clark, Stewart & Fortas, JJ., concurring).
16. 403 U.S. at 44 (Brennan, J., Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., concurring).
17. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 170 (Black & Douglas, JJ., con-
curring); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. at 57 (Black, J., concurring).
18. 418 U.S. at 325-26. A complete list of the libelous statements can be found
in Moorman, Comments on the Current State of the Law of Libel in the United States-
Protection of the Defamatory Falsehood and the Careless Liar, 1971 11iAL IAWYER'S
GuinE 40, 57-59.
19. 322 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1970), affd, 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972),
rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
20. Id. at 1000.
21. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), revd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
22. Justice Powell was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehn-
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plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure, 23 found that
application of the public event test to remarks defaming private individ-
uals results in an uncalled-for abridgment of the legitimate state interest
in compensating such individuals for injury to reputation .2  Like the
earlier arguments of Justice Harlan, the Gertz opinion noted that private
individuals are to be distinguished from public figures because they lack
"access to the channels of effective communication" and therefore do
not have "a realistic opportunity to counteract false statements. ' 21 The
majority was also of the opinion that while the media are entitled to act
on the assumption that public figures "run the risk of closer public scru-
tiny,'"26 they cannot further assume that private figures who become in-
volved in public events run a similar risk.27 The Court further noted that
not only does the public event test fail to protect the interests of the indi-
vidual, it also fails to adequately safeguard freedom of the press.28 Faced
with a standard of strict liability when a trial judge, in hindsight, deter-
mines that the event was of only private interest, the defendant will likely
be deterred from publishing even protected expression. 29
To eliminate this threat of self-censorship and yet accommodate the
state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputa-
tion, the Court held that "so long as they do not impose liability without
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious
to a private individual."30 Any such definition of fault, however, must be
correlated with the various state interests served by the law of defamation
and with the different damage awards which that law permits.8 The in-
quist. 418 U.S. at 324. Justice Blackmun also concurred separately to explain his rea-
sons for joining the majority: the limitations on state law would provide adequate
breathing space for the press, and it was of paramount importance to present a majority
opinion. Id. at 353-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justices Douglas and Brennan dis-
sented, stating that the decision of the court of appeals should have been affirmed. Id.
at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas was of
the opinion that the defendant's article was absolutely privileged. Id. at 360. Justice
Brennan felt that it was conditionally privileged but that knowing or reckless falsity had
not been shown. Id. at 369. The Chief Justice and Justice White also dissented, pre-
ferring to reinstate the verdict for the plaintiff rather than remand for further proceed-
ings. Id. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 404 (White, J., dissenting). The Chief Jus-
tice noted that the important social role served by attorneys would be imperiled if they
were subject to the type of criticism which had been directed at Mr. Gertz. He also
questioned the propriety of federalizing the law of defamation. Id. at 354-55. In a
lengthy opinion Justice White criticized the federalization of state tort law. Id. at 369-
404.
23. Id. at 351-52.
24. Id. at 345-46.
25. Id. at 344.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 345.
28. Id. at 346.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 349.
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tentional or reckless lie has long been held to be beyond the pale of first
amendment protection,32 and consequently the states are not prohibited
from imposing punitive damages in furtherance of a legitimate interest in
deterring such remarks. 33 On the other hand, when the error is less cul-
pably made, the Gertz Court expressly refused to acknowledge any inter-
est other than compensation for actual injury.34 In reaching this conclu-
sion the Court noted that recovery of damages beyond those awarded for
the compensation of actual injury not only results in an unnecessary de-
terrent to the exercise of first amendment rights, but also exceeds the
state's legitimate interest in compensation by providing a mechanism
whereby juries can punish unpopular speech with largely uncontrolled
discretion.35 Therefore, "the States may not permit recovery of presumed
or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."36
CALIFORNIA DEFAMATION PRIOR TO GERTZ
The effect of Gertz upon California law cannot, of course, be under-
stood without at least a cursory description of the law as it existed imme-
diately prior to the Gertz decision. The organization which seems to be
best suited to this survey is to review, in order, the different types of
defamatory statements for which an action can be brought, the elements
of the plaintiff's cause of action, and the available defenses. 37
A. Types of Defamatory Statements
The right to be free from injury to reputation is recognized in Califor-
nia 8 and is protected by the law of defamation, which categorizes ac-
tionable statements as either libel or slander.39 The former is published
"by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the
eye."40  All other publications, including oral utterances and all com-
munications by radio or other mechanical means, are slander. 41 A fur-
ther distinction is made between those statements which are actionable
per se and those which are actionable only when the plaintiff pleads
that as a result of the statement he has suffered special damages.42
32. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
33. Cf. id. at 74.
34. 418 U.S. at 349.
35. Id. at 349-50.
36. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
37. For a more extensive discussion of California law prior to Gertz, see 4 B. Wrr-
KIN, SUMMARY oF CALiOIRIA_ LAw, Torts §§271-326 (8th ed. 1974).
38. CAL. CIv. CODE §43.
39. CAL. CIV. CODE §44.
40. CAL. Cwv. CODE §45.
41. CAL. CIV. CODE §46.
42. See PROSSER, supra note 1, §112.
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Much of the confusion in the law of defamation stems from the fact
that the distinction between those statements which are actionable per
se and those which are not (also termed actionable per quod) is not
the same for libel as for slander.4" In the former, the distinction turns
upon whether the defamation is complete within the content of the
published remark,44 whereas slander is differentiated according to the
particular imputation which is made,45 regardless of whether that im-
putation is complete on the face of the utterance or is made so only
by allegation of extrinsic fact.46 Libel per se in California is that
"which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explana-
tory matter, such as inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact,"
47
and all other libel is termed libel per quod.48 Slander per se includes
those utterances which, either on their face or by resort to extrinsic
evidence,49 impute to the plaintiff commission of a crime, loathsome
disease, impotence or lack of chastity, or directly tend to injure him
in his occupation.50 All other slander, which may be termed slander
per quod, 51 is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges that it has re-
sulted in special damages, 52 regardless of its content.53
B. The Plaintiffs Cause of Action
In order to state a cause of action for defamation, the plaintiff must
allege that the defendant published matter defamatory of the plaintiff
and that, as a result, the plaintiff has suffered injury. 4 It is also neces-
sary, where the complaint reveals that the defendant published under a
conditional or constitutional privilege, or where exemplary damages are
sought, to allege that the defendant acted with malice." Three of the
43. Id.
44. CAL. Crv. CODE §45a.
45. CAL. CIV. CODE §46.
46. White v. Valenta, 234 Cal. App. 2d 243, 252, 44 Cal. Rvtr. 241, 246 (1965).
47. CAL. CIV. CODE §45a.
48. Prosser. Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839, 844 (1960).
49. White v. Valenta, 234 Cal. App. 2d 243, 252, 44 Cal. Rptr. 241, 246 (1965).
50. CAL. CIV. CODE §46(1-4).
51. The use of "per quod," as can be seen from the text, is confusing at best.
PROSSER, supra note 1, does not use the term in connection with slander, but its use in
this context is not improper, see 1 A. HANSON, LMEL AND RELATED TORTS 46 (1969).
52. The slander statute uses the term "actual damages." CAL. CIV. CODE §46(5).
In contrast, the libel statute refers to "special damages," CAL. CiM. CODE §45a. Though
actual damage is often considered to include both special and general damages, Childers
v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 288-89, 38 P. 903, 904
(1894), in the context of slander it seems to refer only to special damages. Cf. Correia
v. Santos, 191 Cal. App. 2d 844, 856, 13 Cal. Rptr. 132, 139 (1961). See also PROSSER,
supra note 1, §1-12, at 760-61.
53. CAL. Crv. CODE §46(5).
54. For a more extensive discussion of pleading defamation in California prior to
Gertz, see 3 B. WrrxiN, CALIFORNA PRocEDuRE, Pleading §§594-605, 792 (2d ed. 1971).
55. Hale Co. v. Lea, 191 Cal. 202, 215 P. 900 (1923) (conditional privilege);
Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App. 2d 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1966) (constitutional
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elements of the cause of action-the publication, the defamatory con-
tent, and the reference to the plaintiff-go to the defendant's liability,
whereas an allegation of malice may bear upon both liability and dam-
ages.5
6
As defamation is an injury to reputation-the opinion which others
have of the plaintiff-it is essential to the tort that the statements were
published to persons other than the plaintiff.57 Prior to Gertz, this was
the only element for which the defendant was not strictly liable,58 and in
California, if publication to a third party is neither intended nor reasona-
bly foreseeable, there is no liability.59 However, before Gertz, once it
was shown that the defendant was at fault for the fact of publication,
he was held strictly liable for the statement's defamatory content and
its reference to the plaintiff.60 Absent a privilege, it was not proper,
in ascertaining liability, to consider the defendant's good faith belief
in the truth of the statements6 ' or the fact that the reference to the
particular plaintiff was unintended or the result of innocent mistake, 6
although these circumstances may have been of importance in the de-
termination of whether exemplary damages could be awarded. 8
The final element in every action for defamation is injury to the plain-
tiff. In California, three categories of damages-general, special, and
exemplary-are potentially available to a successful defamation plain-
tiff.8 4 General damages include loss of reputation as well as pain and
suffering,6" and prior to Gertz, they were presumed whenever the de-
famatory publication was libelous per se or slanderous per se.66 Special
damages include injury to property and occupation, as well as out of
privilege); Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381, 22 P.2d 569 (1933) (exemplary
amages).
56. PROSSER, supra note 1, §115, at 794-95.
57. PROSSER, supra note 1, §113, at 766. In the law of defamation, "publish" is
a word of art which means only this essential communication to third parties. Farr V.
Bramblett. 132 Cal. App. 2d 36, 46, 281 P.2d 372, 378 (1955).
58. PROSSER, supra note 1, §113, at 771.
59. Shoemaker v. Friedberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 911, 183 P.2d 318 (1947).
60. PROSSER, supra note 1, §113, at 771.
61. Cf. Morris v. Lachman, 68 Cal. 109, 112, 8 P. 799, 800 (1885).
62. Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 270. 40 P. 392, 394 (1895).
63. Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530 (1911).
64. Cf. CAL. Crv. CODE § 48a(2). Although a literal reading of section 48a would
limit its definition of damages to actions under the correction statute, California courts
have applied these definitions to other defamation actions. E.g., Campbell v. Jewish
Comm. for Personal Serv., 125 Cal. App. 2d 771, 775-76, 271 P.2d 185, 188 (1954).
65. Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 288-
89, 38 P. 903, 904 (1894); CAL. Crv. CODE §48a(4) (a).
66. Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 284, 9 P.2d 505, 507 (1932) (libel); Moran-
ville v. Aletto, 153 Cal. App. 2d 667, 672, 315 P.2d 91, 94 (1957) (slander). This
rule has been justified on the ground that it is too difficult to find witnesses who are
willing to testify that their opinions of the plaintiff have been in any way affected by
the statement, even when it is probable that the plaintiff's reputation has in fact been
injured. Note, Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875, 891-92
(1956).
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pocket losses, 7 and in order to state a cause of action, must be pleaded
when the statement falls within the categories of either libel per quod or
slander per quod.68 Exemplary damages are awarded for the sake of
example and punishment and are available in the court's discretion
when it is alleged and proved that the defendant published with the req-
uisite malice. 9
"Malice" is a confusing term in the law of defamation. This confusion
is due, at least in part, to the indiscriminate use of the terms "malice in
law" and "malice in fact. ' 70 Malice in law is primarily of historical im-
portance 71 and may be defined as a state of mind evidenced by a "wrong-
ful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. ' 72 Though pre-
sumed in every action for libel or slander,7 3 malice in law is of no
consequence in the determination of exemplary awards."' Malice in fact
is "a spiteful or rancorous disposition which causes an act to be done for
mischief, ' 75 and unlike malice in law, it is never presumed. " It is an
important element of the cause of action where the plaintiff seeks an
award of exemplary damages77 or the complaint reveals that the defend-
ant published under one of the statutory conditional privileges. 8 A third
type of malice, which became important with the development of the
New York Times privilege, is the standard of knowing or reckless falsi-
ty.71 Prior to Gertz, this constitutional malice had to be alleged whenever
the complaint revealed the applicability of the public official, public fig-
ure, or public event privilege. s0
In 1931 California enacted a correction statute which substantially
altered the plaintiff's cause of action against a media defendant,8 Under
67. Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 288, 38
P. 903, 904 (1894); CAL. Civ. CODE §48a(4)(b).
68. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§45a, 46(5).
69. CAL. CIV. CODE §§48a(4)(c), 3294.
70. 'The jumble in some modem text-books on slander and libel concerning
malice, actual malice, malice in law, malice in fact, implied malice and express malice
. ..is a striking testimony of the limitations of the human mind." Ullrich v. New York
Press Co., 23 Misc. 168, 171-72, 50 N.Y.S. 788, 791 (App. Div. 1898).
71. See PRossER, supra note 1, §113, at 771-72.
72. Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & iPublishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 288,
38 P. 903, 904 (1894).
73. Id.
74. Cf. CAL. Cv. CODE §48a(4) (c-d).
75. Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 288
38 P. 903, 904 (1894).
76. Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 179, 116 P. 530, 546 (1911).
77. Id. at 163, 116 P. at 539.
78. Locke v. Mitchell, 7 Cal. 2d 599, 61 P.2d 922 (1936). Common law malice-
in-fact exists when the narrower standard of constitutional malice is proved. New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292 n.30, cited in Mullins v. Brando, 13 Cal. App. 3d
409, 418, 91 Cal. Rptr. 796, 802 (1970).
79. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
80. E.g., Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App. 2d 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1966)
(public figure).
81. CAL. Crv. CODE §48a.
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the statute, a person who seeks damages for newspaper libel or broadcast
slander must plead that he notified the defendant of the defamation and
demanded a correction. s2 Prior to Gertz, if the publisher or broadcaster
refused to make a timely and proper correction after such notice and
demand, the successful plaintiff could, upon proper pleading and proof,
recover general, special, and, when appropriate, exemplary damages.8 3
If the correction was properly made, or if the plaintiff did not comply
with the statute, only special damages could be awarded. 4
C. Defenses
At common law there were two affirmative defenses to a defamation
action-privilege and truth.88 California, while preserving these de-
fenses, has added a third, due care, which is available in limited in-
stances.8 6
The defense of privilege is based upon the rationale that certain publi-
cations are made in furtherance of social interests "which [are] entitled
to protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plain-
tiffs reputation."8 7 An absolute privilege protects statements made by a
public official in the proper discharge of an official duty and those made
in the course of a legislative, judicial, or other official proceeding.8 8 Cali-
fonia law, unlike the common law majority rule,89 extends the absolute
privilege to fair and true reports of official or other public proceedings.90
A conditional privilege is recognized in California when the parties to a
communication share a common interest or stand in such a relation to
each other as to provide a reasonable ground for supposing that the mo-
tive for the communication is innocent, or when the listener requests the
publication.91 By judicial construction this privilege has incorporated
most of the common law privileges for statements made in the speaker's
own interest, in the interests of others, in a common interest, to one who
acts in the public interest, and in fair comment on matters of public con-
82. CAL. Crv. CODn §48a(1). Because the correction must be published or broad-
cast within three weeks of the plaintiff's notice and demand, the statute does not apply
to actions against monthly periodicals. Morris v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 192 Cal.
App. 2d 162, 165-66, 13 Cal. Rptr. 336, 338-39 (196-1).
83. CAL. CIv. CODE §48a(2).
84. CAL. Crv. CODE §48a(1).
85. PRossEa, supra note 1, §§1 14-116. Consent is sometimes considered a defense,
but may also be classified as a particular form of privilege. Id. §114, at 784-85.
86. CAL. CIv. CODE §48.5. See text accompanying notes 107-109 infra.
87. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 114, at 776.
88. CAL. CiV. CODE §47(1-2).
89. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 115, at 792, §118, at 830-33.
90. CAL. CIV. CODE §47(4-5); 4 B. WrrrIN, SuMMARY OF CALIFONIA Lw, Torts
§302 (8th ed. 1974).
91. CAL. Civ. CODE §47(3).
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cern.92 The distinction between these two broad categories of privileges
is that a conditional privilege is lost if the defendant abuses it, whereas an
absolute privilege cannot be lost through abuse.93 The New York Times
privilege, though of comparatively recent origin, is similar to the statu-
tory conditional privileges in that it, too, may be lost when the defendant
publishes with malice,9 4 but this constitutional malice differs from the
standard of malice in fact which will vitiate the traditional conditional
privileges. 5
The conditional privilege of fair comment deserves special attention,
not only because its common law counterpart is generally considered to
be the predecessor of the New York Times privilege,98 but also because
of the greater importance it is likely to assume after Gertz. While it can
be broadly stated that this privilege protects remarks made to the public
at large about matters of legitimate public concern,9 7 the limits of legiti-
mate public concern have not been determined with certainty. The fair
comment privilege in California clearly applies to remarks about public
officials and public figures,98 but the cases decided prior to New York
Times were not definite as to whether the privilege also applied to state-
ments concerning events of public interest.99 With the rapid expansion
of the New York Times holding, particularly in the plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom, the need to clarify the California law was stayed by the
development of a constitutional privilege which did encompass discus-
sions of public events. 00 However, since Gertz eliminates the federal
92. 4 B. WrriN, SUMMARY OF CALIORNIA LAw, Torts §§301-310 (8th ed. 1974);
PROSSER, supra note 1, §115, at 785-92, §118, at 819-20.
93. PROSSER, supra note 1, §114, at 776-77.
94. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
95. See text accompanying notes 70-80 supra. The New York Times privilege is
also unique in that its abuse must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 376 U.S.
at 285-86. In contrast, the statutory conditional privilege is lost if the plaintiff proves
its abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. See CAL. Evmn. CODE §115.
96. PROSSER, supra note 1, §118, at 819.
97. Id.
98. Maidman v. Jewish Publications, 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265, 7 Cal. Rptr.
617 (1960) (prominent attorney); Maher v. Devlin, 203 Cal. 270, 263 P. 812 (1928)
(mayor); Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921) (police
chief); Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal. App. 2d 528, 186 P.2d 737 (1947)
(political candidate); Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 121 P.2d
761 (1942) (school board president); Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381, 22 P.2d 569
(1933) (city councilman); Eva v. Smith, 89 Cal. App. 324, 264 'P. 803 (1928) (city
councilman); Jones v. Express Publishing Co., 87 Cal. App. 246, 262 P. 78 (1927) (dep-
uty district attorney).
99. See Williams v. Daily Review, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 2d 405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135
(1965); Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946). In both cases
the result may have been reached on the basis that the publication was protected by the
absolute privilege of fair and true report of a public proceeding.
100. For cases applying the New York Times privilege in California see Cerrito v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971), aff'g 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1969)
(public events); Belli v. Curtis Publishing Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122
(1972) (public figures); Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App. 2d 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 517
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public event privilege, it will again become necessary to determine
whether the California fair comment privilege protects statements about
public events.
The second general defense to defamation is truth, which unlike the
conditional privileges, is a complete defense even when the defendant
publishes with actual malice.""1 It was once the rule that the burden of
pleading falsity was upon the plaintiff, 02 but upon proof that the publi-
cation was defamatory, a presumption of falsity arose which shifted the
burden of proving the truth to the defendant. 0 3 The defendant then had
the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the
gist of the defamatory charge was true. 0 4 In Lipman v. Brisbane Ele-
mentary School District,0 5 the California Supreme Court recognized
the inconsistency of requiring one party to plead falsity and forcing the
other party to bear the burden of proof upon that same issue. In resolving
this anomaly the court struck down the requirement that the plaintiff
plead falsity,'08 and prior to Gertz, the burden of both the pleading and
proof of the issue of truth was consequently upon the defendant.
A third defense available in California before Gertz was that of due
care. As defamation has been, at least as to defamatory content and ref-
erence to the plaintiff, a strict liability tort,10 7 due care was never a de-
fense to an action for libel or slander at common law and could not be
considered in the determination of compensatory damages. 10 8 By stat-
ute in California, however, an owner, licensee, operator, agent, or em-
ployee of a television or radio broadcast station cannot be held liable for
a slander made over the broadcast facilities by anyone other than such
owner, licensee, operator, agent, or employee if he alleges and proves
that he exercised due care to prevent the broadcast of the slanderous
remark.' 0
9
THE EFFECT OF GERTZ ON CALIFORNIA LAW
One of the Gertz holdings dealt with fault"0 and the other with dam-
ages."' In order to analyze the impact of these holdings on the law of
(1966) (political candidate); Kramer v. Ferguson, 230 Cal. App. 2d 237, 41 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1964) (public officials).
101. Swaffield v. Universal Ecsco Corp., 271 Cal. App. 2d 147, 164, 76 Cal. Rptr.
680, 690 (1969).
102. Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 661, 171 P.2d 118, 125 (1946).
103. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 116, at 798.
104. Hearne v. De Young, 119 Cal. 670, 681-82, 52 P. 150, 154 (1898).
105. 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
106. Id. at 233, 359 P.2d at 469, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
107. See text accompanying notes 57-63 supra.
108. Taylor v. Hearst, 118 Cal. 366, 50 P. 541 (1897).
109. CAL. Civ. CODE §48.5(1).
110. 418 U.S. at 347.
111. Id. at 349.
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defamation in California, it is necessary to determine the parties to
which the Gertz decision must be applied and the effect of each holding
on the cause of action and the defenses. From the language of the Gertz
decision it is apparent that its applicability is a function of both the status
of the defendant and the status of the plaintiff. The determination of
whether the defendant is a member of the media is important because the
holdings on fault and damages both apply when the defendant is of the
media," 2 while only the damages holding applies to actions brought
against nonmedia speakers." 3 In contrast, the determination of whether
the plaintiff is a public or private figure determines whether Gertz is
applicable at all.
Looking first to the status of the plaintiff, it is critical to examine how
the delineation between public figures and private figures is to be drawn.
The Court suggested several guidelines for categorizing an individual as
a public figure, all of which were based largely upon the rationale that
such persons have assumed the risk of public criticism."14 Recognizing
that it is possible to become a public figure passively as well as purpose-
fully, the Court stated that in either instance the media are entitled to act
on the assumption that such criticism has been invited."' The media
cannot assume, however, that a person's prominence in certain affairs
renders him a public figure for all purposes, for in the last analysis the
question must be resolved in light of the "nature and extent of an individ-
ual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defa-
mation."" O6 The Gertz description of a public figure thus represents a
departure from the test proposed by Justice Harlan in Butts, which
would define a public figure as one who has attained public interest inde-
pendent of the controversy at hand." 7 If, pursuant to Gertz, it it deter-
mined that the public figure privilege is apparent on the face of the com-
plaint, then a cause of action is not complete without alleging that the
defendant acted with constitutional malice. 1 8 On the other hand, when
the plaintiff is a private figure the New York Times privilege is not appli-
cable, and the plaintiff must frame his complaint in accordance with the
Gertz holdings on fault and damages. Once it has been determined that
112. See text accompanying notes 150-154 infra.
113. See text accompanying notes 122-130 infra.
114. 418 U.S. at 344. The Court partially discounted the argument that public fig-
ures have a greater opportunity for rebuttal by noting that "the truth rarely catches up
with a lie." Id. at 344 n.9. Justice Brennan had long discredited this argument. Id.
at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 345.
116. Id. at 354.
117. 388 U.S. at 154-55.
118. Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App. 2d 447, 452, 48 Cal. Rptr. 817, 821
(1966).
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the plaintiff is a private figure, and therefore that the New York Times
privilege is not applicable, then the significance of Gertz will depend
upon the status of the defendant.
In order to determine which party must bear the burden of alleging
and proving fault and damages, it is initially necessary to decide whether
Gertz merely expands the constitutional defenses first developed in New
York Times or whether it applies directly to the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion. Since the necessity of alleging damages has traditionally rested with
the plaintiff and since the Gertz damages holding merely modifies and
explains the damages which are available in a defamation action, it is
clear that the plaintiff will continue to bear the burden of pleading and
proving damages. In contrast, the procedural impact of the fault holding
is not so clear.
It is possible to look at the Gertz holding on fault in either of two ways.
The first is that it establishes a new privilege, available to the media,
which is abused when the defendant is at fault. Under this view the plain-
tiff would only be required to plead fault when the complaint clearly
reveals that the defendant falls within the definition of "media." In all
other instances a demurrer for failure to allege fault would be denied,
and the action would proceed towards trial. A second approach would
view Gertz as creating a new element in the plaintiff's cause of action
whenever the defendant is from the media. Under this view, a general
demurrer for failure to allege fault would lie whenever the complaint
clearly reveals the media character of the defendant. Under this ap-
proach, however, it could be argued that when the status of the defend-
ant is uncertain, the plaintiff should be required to allege the media or
nonmedia character of the defendant with specificity. 119 If the plaintiff
is required to specifically plead the status of the defendant, his complaint
will also reveal whether it is necessary to allege fault in order to state a
cause of action. Since there would be a greater likelihood that a demurrer
would be sustained if the plaintiff were required to allege fault, there
would correspondingly be a greater likelihood of dismissing such a case
on pretrial motions. Dismissal of vexatious and hastily filed actions
would spare the defendant from the cost of further litigation, which in
itself may be a deterrent to freedom of expression. 120 Since the Gertz
fault holding is based on a rationale of minimizing the deterrent effect of
'119. Cf. Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App. 2d 447, 453, 48 Cal. Rptr. 817, 821
(1966) (necessity of specifically pleading malice in fact).
120. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 367-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
Belli v. Curtis Publishing Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 389, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125
(1972), this same principle was considered in regard to a summary judgment for the
defendant.
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defamation suits against the media, 21 applying the holding to the de-
fendant's case in the form of a privilege would least serve the intentions
of the Court. Therefore, the holding on fault, like that on damages,
should apply directly to the plaintiff's cause of action.
A. The Cause of Action: the Fault Holding
The Gertz opinion examined at length the chilling effect on the media
of the common law standard of strict liability, and the first holding, pro-
scribing the ability of the states to impose liability without fault, was ex-
pressly limited to actions against a "publisher or broadcaster."' 22 Unless
the ramifications of strict liability on the media are different from those
on other speakers, this limitation would appear to be unwarranted. The
existence of a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants has
not been given a great deal of attention by the writers, 2 ' and the Justices
themselves are not in agreement as to whether New York Times and its
progeny have created such a distinction. In his dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice White assumed that the Gertz majority would apply to "each and
every defamation action."' 24 On the other hand, Justice Stewart has stat-
ed that "the Court has never suggested that the constitutional right of
free speech gives an individual any immunity from liability for either
libel or slander."' 25 Clearly, then, what is said here about the application
of Gertz to nonmedia speakers is not only subject to, but seeks clarifica-
tion by the Court.
Some practical differences between the media and other speakers
may support the Court's limitation. The first factor is the vulnerability of
the media to large and frequent judgments. 12 6 This vulnerability is not
so much a matter of financial resources as it is a result of the frequency
with which the media publish.12 7 Secondly, the media are subject to an
increased risk of defamatory error brought on by the pressures of deal-
ing with "hot news" and deadlines, as well as the rigors of collecting
121. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
122. 418 U.S. at 347. Although "publish" is a word of art in the law of defamation,
see note 57 supra, the Court in Gertz appeared to use it in its more conventional sense.
In discussing the holding on fault the Court noted that it "shields the press and broad-
cast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation." 418 U.S. at 348.
123. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Free-
dom of Speech?, 26 HAST. L. 639, 639 (1975).
124. 418 U.S. at 370 (White, J., dissenting).
125. Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HAST. L.J 631, 635 (1975) (excerpted from a
speech delivered at Yale Law School, Nov. 2, 1974). But see Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164-65 (1967) in which Chief Justice Warren reiterated that "the
New York Times standard is an important safeguard for the rights of the press and pub-
lic to inform and be informed on matters of legitimate interest."
126. Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions. Distinguishing
Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 902, 932 (1974).
127. Id.
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information from numerous and diffuse sources. 28 A third difference is
inherent in the very function of the media: in a nation profoundly com-
mitted "to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibit-
ed, robust and wide open,"' 29 it can be argued that the media are worthy
of protection as the primary forum of that debate. 30
On the other hand, experience dictates that a nonmedia speaker may
also be vulnerable to a large judgment and in the course of discussion
may make hurried and unverified statements. Together with the impor-
tant contributions which such a speaker may have for the marketplace of
ideas, these considerations present a compelling argument for removing
the spectre of strict liability from all defamation actions, regardless of
the character of the defendant. Considered as a whole, however, the
probability that a nonmedia speaker is less likely to publish frequent,
hurried, and widely circulated remarks offers some arguable support for
the Court's apparent distinction.
If the distinction is to be maintained it will sooner or later be necessary
to define the term "media." s' 3' No simple formula exists for this defini-
tion, but the factors discussed in distinguishing the two types of speakers
are indicative of the relevant inquiries. Whether a defendant is part of
the media should be a function of the circulation, regularity, and fre-
quency with which he publishes news, information, opinion, or other
expressions on matters of public importance. These factors should be
considered collectively, since a publication which provides significant
information but is not bound by a regular publication schedule is not
subject to the risk incurred by deadline pressure, and thus the danger of
self-censorship is not so prevalent. Similarly, a publication which deals
in matters which are traditionally beyond first amendment protection'32
would not be within the media, as that term is used here, even though
128. Id. at 933.
129. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
'130. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Free-
dom of Speech?, 26 HAST. L.J. 639 passim (1975); Note, First Amendment Protection
Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAL.
L. REv. 902, 933 (1974).
131. In Branzburg v. Hayes the Court expressly refused to accept an invitation to
establish a media privilege with regard to the concealment of news sources because
[slooner or later it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen
who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the tradi-
tional doctrine that liberty of. the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropoli-
tan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.
408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
132. For example, a credit report has been held to be beyond the ambit of the con-
stitutional privilege. Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971). However, in California, credit reports are protected
by the statutory conditional privilege, Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926,
119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1975); CAL. Civ. CODE §1756.
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such a publication might be subject to periodical or contractual deadline
pressure.1
38
The importance of classifying a defendant as part of the media lies in
the fact that a cause of action against such a defendant cannot be main-
tained without a showing of fault. Under traditional defamation law,
liability has been imposed without fault for the defamatory nature of a
statement and for the reference -to the plaintiff.8 4 New York Times and
its progeny, including Gertz, have all dealt with the former element, the
defamatory content. It is clear, then, that the holding on fault applies to
this element, but it is not settled whether fault must also be shown when
the defendant erred only in referring to the plaintiff.8 8 It would seem,
however, that the chilling effect of liability without fault would be the
same for both -the defamatory content and the reference to the plaintiff.
The history of the constitutional privilege has evidenced the Court's con-
cern for the deterrent effect created by the common law of defamation,
which subjected a media defendant to possible litigation for an innocent
mistake concerning the truth or falsity of his statements."' Holding a de-
fendant strictly liable for the reference to the plaintiff creates the same
danger that a publisher or broadcaster will be subject to litigation due to
an innocent mistake. Thus, it appears that under the Gertz holding on
fault, a private figure defamed by a media defendant should be required
to allege that the defendant was at fault for the defamatory content or
the reference to the plaintiff. The Court limited the application of the
fault holding to actions based on statements whose content "makes sub-
stantial danger to reputation apparent" and expressly reserved the de-
termination of what standard should apply to "a factual misstatement
whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster
of its defamatory potential."' 3 7 With respect to statements which are
defamatory on their face, some evidence of the intended standard of
fault is shown by the Court's references to "a reasonably prudent edi-
133. A problem related to the definition of media is whether the term should include
those who, though not actually within the media themselves, disseminate their views
through media channels. If Justice Stewart's statement, see text accompanying note 125
supra, that the Court has never applied the constitutional privilege to nonmedia remarks
is valid, then it must be assumed that individuals who air their views through the media
are within the Court's concept of media. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)
(televised speech by a political candidate); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)
(press conference by a district attorney); Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(political advertisement placed in a newspaper by four clergymen).
134. See text accompanying notes 57-63 supra.
135. Imposing liability without fault for innocently referring to the plaintiff has, for
example, forced a publisher to defend a $10,000 lawsuit when a typesetter's mistake re-
sulted in a newspaper article referring to "J.W. Taylor" rather than the intended "J.N.
Taylor." Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262, 40 P. 392 (1895).
136. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
137. 418 U.S. at 348.
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tor' 38 and a "negligence standard for private defamation actions."'139
In light of this language, it seems safe to say that when a statement
is defamatory on its face, a media defendant may be held liable only
if he is found to be at least ordinarily negligent in not discovering the
falsity of his statements as to the persons to whom they refer.140
By refusing to consider a situation in which a statement is not defama-
tory on its face, the Court has suggested that even some standards of fault
may not adequately protect the media in some situations.' This sugges-
tion makes it difficult to accurately predict what standard will apply in
an action against a publisher of such statements. One possibility is that
since these statements, by the Court's definition, offer no notice of their
potentially defamatory nature, only a more culpable standard, such as
gross negligence or recklessness, will eliminate the threat of self-censor-
ship. Another is that lack of notice is merely a factor to be considered in
the determination of whether or not the defendant breached the duty of
due care owed by a reasonably prudent publisher or broadcaster. This
question, like the applicability of Gertz to nonmedia defendants, will
require further clarification by the Court.
Applying the Gertz fault holding to the different causes of action only
serves to compound the inherent confusion between libel and slander
and actions per se and actions per quod. The Court's distinction between
statements which make "substantial danger to reputation apparent" and
those which do not "warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of
their defamatory potential' 42 appears to be similiar to the distinction
California draws between libel per se and libel per quod. 43 This simple
analogy may not hold true in all situations, however, for it is possible that
a statement, although libelous per quod, may be so scandalous that it
would put a reasonably prudent editor on notice as to its defamatory
potential.144 In comparison, since slander per se is distinguished from
slander per quod not by the completeness of the defamatory content, but
rather by the character of the imputation, 14 5 California is left with four
138. Id. at 348,
139. Id. at 350.
140. The other opinions also indicate that negligence was intended. 418 U.S. at 353
(Blackmun, I., concurring), 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting),
366-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 376 (White, J., dissenting).
141. For a discussion of the different standards of fault see PaossER, supra note 1,
§34.
142. Id. at 348.
143. See text accompanying notes 42-48 supra.
144. An example of such a statement might be "Billy Graham was seen at a bar
consuming alcohol." Since this statement would not be libelous without proof that Billy
Graham is a minister of a religious sect which eschews the consumption of alcohol, it
would fall within the category of libel per quod. Nonetheless, since Billy Graham has
attained such world wide recognition, it could be argued that this statement would put
a reasonably prudent editor on notice of its defamatory potential.
145. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
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types of actions for slander against a media defendant: (1) that which is
slanderous per se on its face; (2) that which requires allegation of spe-
cial damages, but is defamatory on its face; (3) that which is slanderous
per se only by allegation of extrinsic facts; and (4) that which requires
pleading of both special damages and extrinsic fact. Thus, in an action
for libel per se or for the first two types of slander, a private-figure
plaintiff must allege that a media defendant was negligent in failing to
discover the truth about the content of his statements and about the per-
sons to whom those statements referred. When the action is for libel per
quod, or for either of the latter two categories of slander, that same plain-
tiff may be required to plead that the media defendant acted with a more
culpable degree of fault with regard to those elements.
As a general rule, the matter pleaded must also be proved, and Gertz
must therefore be examined to determine the evidentiary standard by
which the plaintiff must prove fault. New York Times required that con-
stitutional malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 146 In con-
trast, Gertz fails to mention the standard of proof by which fault must be
proved. This silence, coupled with the Court's desire to leave the law of
defamation of a private individual to the states,147 indicates that the tradi-
tional standard of proof by preponderance of the evidence 48 is appro-
pliate.
B. The Cause of Action: the Damage Holding
The second holding of Gertz provides that when liability is not based
on the New York Times standard of recklessness, the plaintiff is not
entitled to the presumption of damages or to an award of exemplary
damages.' 49 Again it must be determined whether the holding applies to
nonmedia as well as media defendants. This resolution cannot be made
by parroting the analysis used in ascertaining that the fault holding does
not apply to nonmedia defendants because the two holdings do not ap-
pear to be grounded upon identical rationales.
The holding on damages, unlike that on fault, was not expressly limit-
ed to publishers or broadcasters. 150 More significant, however, is the
twofold rationale which led to the holding on damages. The Court paral-
leled the fault rationale when it recognized the threat of self-censorship
posed by presumed and punitive damages, but it also determined that
the only state interest which justifies an abridgment of freedom of ex-
146. 376 U.S. at 285-86.
147. 418 U.S. at 345, 347.
148. CAL. EVID. CODE §115.
149. 418 U.S. at 349.
150. Compare text accompanying note 30 with text accompanying note 36.
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pression, at least when liability is based on a standard of fault less than
recklessness, is compensation to the plaintiff for actual injury.' More-
over, presumed and punitive damages invite juries to punish unpopular
speech with largely uncontrolled discretion, 12 an invitation which the
Court indicated is at odds with the aims of the first amendment.
53 It
follows, then, that any law which allows a defamation plaintiff to recover
presumed or punitive damages without demonstrating that the defend-
ant acted with knowing or reckless falsity is unconstitutionally over-
broad. 5 4 Unlike strict liability which may chill the exercise of free
speech, the allowance of presumed or punitive awards for the publica-
tion of a defamatory falsehood also punishes the speaker. While there
may be reasons for distinguishing the impact of chill on different types of
speakers, these reasons are not persuasive in analyzing the constitution-
ality of presumed or punitive damages which punish free speech. The
constitutional infirmities inherent in the punishment of the spoken or
written word apply with equal force to all defendants, and thus it would
seem that the Gertz holding on damages would apply to both media and
nonmedia speakers.
If liability is established under the standard of knowing or reckless
falsity, Gertz permits an award of presumed and punitive damages, but
under any less culpable standard, a successful plaintiff is limited to re-
covery for actual injury. 55 The Court was content to leave the definition
of actual injury to the experience of trial courts, but it did state that ac-
tual injury includes "impairment of reputation and standing in the com-
munity, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering," as well
as "out-of-pocket loss."' 5 "Actual injury" thus encompasses both gen-
eral and special damages as they are defined in California.'57 While the
holding would seem to make allegation and proof of actual injury a
necessary element in every defamation action based on a degree of fault
151. 418 U.S. at 349-50. Justices Brennan and White were critical of the Court's
delimitation of the state interests served by the law of defamation. They indicated that
the state also might have a legitimate interest in vindicating the plaintiff's reputation
by a special judgment on the truth or falsity of the defendant's statement even though
money damages could not be awarded. Id. at 368 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 393
(White, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 349-50. Juitice White pointed out that the trial judge or appellate court
do in fact have control over jury awards by their powers of remittitur, reversal, order
for a new trial, or judgment n.o.v. Id. at 394 n.31 (White, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 349.
154. Cf. Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (ex-
emplary awards held unconstitutionally overbroad as applied in a defamation case ini-
tiated by a public figure).
155. 418 U.S. at 349-50.
156. Id. Justice Brennan criticized this interpretation of actual injury because, in
his opinion, it would still leave juries with considerable room to punish unpopular
speech. Id. at 367 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
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less than recklessness, it apparently does not change California's require-
ment that special damages be alleged to state a case in an action other
than libel per se or slander per se,158 even when constitutional malice is
present.
Other than the nebulous statement that actual injury must be sup-
ported by "competent" evidence, 15 9 there is nothing in Gertz to indi-
cate a standard by which the plaintiff must prove the extent of his ac-
tual injury when liability is based upon a showing of culpability less
stringent than constitutional malice. In addition to the Court's failure
to articulate this issue, the entrustment of the definition of actual injury
to the experience of trial courts1 " suggests the propriety of the tradi-
tional measure of preponderance of the evidence. In order to recover
presumed or punitive damages, Gertz indicates that the private defama-
tion plaintiff must establish liability under the standard announced in
New York Times' 6M--proof by clear and convincing evidence.
0 2
C. The Cause of Action: the Correction Statute
Whatever the scope of Gertz with regard to nonmedia defendants, it
clearly has qualified actions against the media and, in so doing, affected
California's correction statute. 16 3 The plaintiff's burden to state a cause
of action under the statute is made more rigorous by Gertz: to recover
general damages not only must he plead notice, demand, and failure to
correct, as required by the statute,'6 4 but also fault and the extent of his
actual injury. 65 Even when the plaintifff is only entitled to special dam-
ages because he failed to comply with the statute or a correction was
properly made, 66 he apparently must still plead that the defendant was
at fault for the defamatory error. Moreover, to be entitled to exemplary
damages he must plead that the defendant published with knowing or
reckless falsity.6 7
Since fault is a necessary element of actions against the media after
Gertz, it must be determined whether a failure to publish or broadcast a
correction may be indicative of fault. Failure to retract was not evidence
of malice under the circumstances of New York Times, and that case and
its progeny have pointed out that the Court's concept of fault is based
158. See text accompanying notes 42 and 68 supra.
159. 418 U.S. at 350.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 376 U.S. at 285-86.
163. CAL. Civ. CODE §48a. See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
164. CAL. CIV. CODE §48a(2).
165. See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
166. CAL. CIV. CODE §4a(1).
167. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
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more upon an objective knowledge or lack of knowledge of certain facts
at the time of publication than upon a subjective determination of the de-
fendant's motive. 168 Failure to issue a correction, for whatever purpose,
cannot fairly be said to relate back to the speaker's knowledge at the time
of publication, and it would seem, therefore, that a failure to retract




Though it dealt primarily with the plaintiff's case, Gertz is not without
effect on the defenses to defamation. By requiring the plaintiff to prove
that a media defendant was at least negligent, Gertz has rendered the
broadcaster's defense of due care superfluous. 7° More significantly,
however, in reshaping the constitutional privilege, it has revived some of
the statutory conditional privileges. Because the rigorous New York
Times standard was so broadly applicable, particularly after Rosen-
bloom, the constitutional privilege supplanted many of the conditional
privileges which would otherwise have applied to a media report of
events of public interest.' 7 ' By rolling back the constitutional privilege
to a point where it protects only those statements made about public
officials and public figures and no longer extends to discussion of public
events, Gertz revives the fair comment privilege, 172 at least to the extent
that it protects discussion of events of public concern. Since it is not clear
that California ever had a public event privilege separate from the New
York Times privilege, 71 the courts and legislature are free to pursue at
least two possibilities in this area.
One possibility is that California will adopt a public event privilege,
apart from the fair comment privilege, which will be lost only where the
plaintiff proves that the defendant published with knowing or reckless
168. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp.
v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286
(1964); cf. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 95 S. Ct. 465, 469-71 (1974).
169. But see Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 344, 160
N.W.2d 1, 11 (1968), stating that a refusal to retract is indicative of reckless indiffer-
ence under the New York Times privilege. Cases in other jurisdictions, however, have
held that failure to retract is evidence of malice in fact with regard to the abuse of a
conditional privilege. Metropolis Co. v. Croasdell, 145 Fla. 455, 458, 199 So. 568, 570
(1941); Augusta Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Arrington, 42 Ga. App. 746, 750, 157 S.E.
394, 396 (1931); Vigil v. Rice, 74 N.M. 693, 699, 397 P.2d 719, 723 (1964); Stevenson
v. Morris, 288 Pa. 405, 410-11, 136 A. 234, 235-36 (1927).
170. See text accompanying notes 107-109 supra.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §606, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 20,
1974).
172. CAL. CIV. CODE §47(3).
173. See text accompanying notes 96-100 supra.
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falsity.' 74 If such a course were taken it would offer a media defendant
more protection than the Gertz holding: a negligent publisher or broad-
caster would still be protected by a state privilege which required at least
reckless error. A second possibility is the incorporation of a public event
privilege as part of the common law conditional privilege of fair com-
ment. California has codified this privilege in Civil Code Section 47(3)
which provides that the privilege is vitiated if the communication is
made maliciously. 175 It is possible that a media defendant who is not
negligent in his failure to discover the falsity of his statement will publish
or broadcast the remark for an improper purpose, or for an interest be-
yond that for which the privilege is recognized. It is also possible that a
similar defendant who is negligent in failing to discover the falsity of his
statements will publish or broadcast for a proper purpose within the
interests protected by the privilege. In neither instance could the defend-
ant be held liable, but the reasons in each situation differ: in the former
he would be protected by the Gertz holding on fault, and in the latter his
statement would be within the conditional privilege.
A public event privilege, as part of the common law privilege of fair
comment, is only one of the many conditional privileges which might be
asserted by a media defendant. 7 6 Whether any of these privileges will
offer greater protection than Gertz will depend upon the applicability of
such privileges to media reports other than discussions of public officials
174. In Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321
N.E.2d 580 (1974), an Indiana appellate court adopted the Rosenbloom standard of
knowing or reckless falsity in a discussion of public events, though the plaintiff was a
private figure. In light of Gertz, the Indiana courts would still be barred from imposing
liability without fault where the event was of only private concern. Justice Brennan,
who wrote the Rosenbloom opinion, would possibly have allowed strict liability where
the event giving rise to the article was of only private concern. Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. ,418 U.S. at 368 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Exactly what constitutes malice sufficient to establish abuse of this privilege
is subject to some confusion. One California Supreme Court decision, Emde v. San
Joaquin County Central Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 154-55, 143 P.2d 20, 25 (1943),
stated in dictum that abuse of the privilege is shown
by the publisher's lack of belief, or of reasonable grounds for belief, in the
truth of the defamatory matter, by excessive publication, by a publication of
defamatory matter for an improper purpose, or if the defamation goes beyond
the [privileged] interest.
Witkin notes that this is consistent with the Restatement. 4 B. WrIXN, SUMMARY OF
CALiFoRNIA lAw, Torts §302 (8th ed. 1974). However, a recent appellate decision,
Tendler v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 738, 791, 118 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276
(1974), held that "Mere negligence cannot constitute evidence of malice in fact."
176. In Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948),
a privilege of common interest was asserted in a libel action between church members
arising from press releases issued by the defendants. The privilege was found to be
abused because the defendant was improperly motivated, id. at 798, 197 P.2d at 718,
yet had the defendant been able to invoke Gertz on the basis that through the press re-
leases he was acting as media, see note 134 supra, his motivation would not have been
a conclusive determinant of liability. n Brewer, however, the court also indicated that
the jury could infer that the defendant lacked even reasonable grounds to believe in the
truth of the publication. 32 Cal. 2d at 800, 197 P.2d at 719.
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or public figures and on the means by which such privileges are abused.
Gertz may also portend a change in the burden of pleading and prov-
ing the issue of truth or falsity. Traditionally the defendant has been
required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the state-
ment was true, 177 but in introducing the fault holding the Court stated
that "[a]llowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the truth of
all injurious statements does not accord adequate protection to First
Amendment liberties.' 178 This statement recalls the opinion in Speiser
v. Randall, 79 in which the Court indicated that a speaker should not be
required to bear the burden of proving that his remarks are within the
protection of the first amendment in order to obtain a benefit from the
state. In reaching this conclusion the Speiser Court explained that
where particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful
and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken factfinding-inherent
in all litigation-will create the danger that the legitimate utterance
will be penalized. The man who knows that he must bring forth
proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct neces-
sarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State
must bear these burdens' 80
Three factors which are involved in the proof of truth suggest that the
Speiser argument is equally applicable to a civil action for defamation
against a media defendant.'-' The first consideration is the very elusive
nature of the concept of truth. As Justice Harlan once stated, "Any na-
tion which counts the Scopes trial as part of its heritage cannot so readily
expose ideas to sanctions on a jury finding of falsity."'" 2 What Justice
Harlan noted about a jury finding should apply with equal force to a
presumption of falsity which requires that a defendant prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that his statement is true. Secondly, requir-
ing a media defendant to prove the truth may force him to choose be-
tween yielding to a judgment or revealing a confidential source.8 3
177. See text accompanying notes 101-106 supra.
178. 418 U.S. at 340 (dictum).
179. 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
180. Id. at 526.
181. The presumption of falsity is clearly not applicable when liability must be es-
tablished by the standard developed in New York Times. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74 (1964). If in the future the Court does address the constitutionality of the
presumption of falsity in private figure defamation cases, it will also have to decide
whether the presumption impacts on media and nonmedia speakers similarly. Since the
argument in Speiser suggested that the chill on speech is indirect, it would seem to be
analogous to the effect of strict liability, and therefore the Court might limit any opinion
to actions against media defendants. See text accompanying notes 122-130 supra.
182. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967).
183. For a general discussion of the newsman's privilege see Goodale, Branzburg v.
Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HAST. L.J. 709 (1975);
Comment, Newsman's Privilege: A Survey of the Law in California, 4 PAC. L.J. 880
(1973).
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Rather than make such a choice, he may well abstain from publishing
significant information which he acquires from such sources. The third
factor is that the plaintiff will often have superior access to the evidence
necessary to prove the truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory state-
ment.1
84
Paraphrasing the argument in Speiser, the media defendant who
knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the truth-
fulness of his statement must steer far wider of unprotected speech than
if the plaintiff must bear these burdens. If the defendant is required to
prove that his published remarks are true, then an ambiguous case may
result in liability for truthful criticism. On the other hand, when the
burden is placed upon the plaintiff to show that the statement is false, a
similar case may allow defamatory falsehoods to circulate without
sanction. The history of the New York Times privilege suggests that the
latter alternative is to be preferred.
CONCLUSION
There is an inherent conflict between the law of defamation and the
constitutional command that the freedoms of speech and press be una-
bridged. Beginning with New York Times in 1964, the Supreme Court's
efforts to resolve this conflict resulted in a broad privilege conditioned
on the absence of knowing or reckless falsity. This privilege reached its
broadest scope in Rosenbloom, when a plurality opinion indicated that
all discussion of events of public concern was constitutionally protected.
Then in Gertz a majority of the Court rejected this public event test and
limited the New York Times privilege to statements about public offi-
cials and public figures. Gertz was not a product of total insensitivity to
the first amendment, but of a new approach to balancing the competing
interests of protecting reputation and assuring freedom of expression.
Instead of expanding the defendant's privilege, the Gertz Court studied
specific areas of the plaintiff's cause of action and concluded that first
amendment interests would be adequately safeguarded by modifying
those areas. After Gertz, a private defamation plaintiff will be required
to plead and prove that a media defendant was at least negligent in
failing to discover the falsity of his statements or to whom they referred.
Furthermore, unless the private plaintiff can establish liability in ac-
cordance with the rigorous New York Times standard of clear and con-
vincing proof of knowing or reckless falsity, he will be barred from re-
184. The superior access doetrine is not a steadfast rule of evidence, but the pre-
sumption of falsity in the traditional law of defamation is a notable exception. 9 J.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE IN EVIDENCE §2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940).
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covering either presumed or punitive damages from a media defendant
and perhaps from a nonmedia defendant as well.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Gertz, expressed the
hope that the proscription of liabilty without fault and the limitation on
damages would permit the Court to come to rest in its efforts to deal with
the law of defamation. 8 5 Unfortunately, several questions left unre-
solved by Gertz render that hope somewhat ephemeral. The majority
admittedly refused to consider the standard of fault for a publisher of
statements which are not defamatory on their face and this, of course,
remains to be determined. More difficult issues are those only implied in
Gertz. By its continuous references to publishers and broadcasters Gertz
suggests that media and nonmedia speakers have different first amend-
ment interests, that the boundaries of freedom of the press and freedom
of speech are not necessarily coterminous. The Court must sooner or
later decide whether Gertz is limited to the media or if either or both of
its holdings can be applied to defamation actions against other speakers
as well. If in fact the holdings are to be limited, then it will be imperative
to define "media," a difficult task in light of the romantic concept of the
press in American history. In the future the Court may also be required
to examine other facets of the law of defamation, just as it analyzed lia-
bility without fault and the availability of presumed and punitive dam-
ages. One area particularly in need of such study is the presumption that
a defamatory statement is false.
In whatever way the Supreme Court chooses to resolve these prob-
lems, it seems certain that the broader parameters of the federalization of
the law of defamation have been drawn and the prospects for that law
now lie with the states. The legislature and courts of California must now
re-examine the area of defamation in light of the arguments developed
over the last decade. One important determination which must be made
is whether a public event privilege in California is viable after Gertz and
if so, by what standard of conduct that privilege may be lost. It is signifi-
cant to note that Gertz does not prohibit the states from developing on
their own a more rigorous standard of fault than negligence in media
cases, or for that matter, from extending the Gertz holdings to all de-
fendants. Most importantly, by finally presenting a majority opinion,
Gertz has removed much of the speculation engendered by the prior
plurality opinions and should provide some much needed stability in the
law of defamation.
Douglas C. Hamilton
185. 418 U.S. at 354.
